We report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g., harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution.
Introduction
David Lewis (1983, p. x) famously remarked, "Philosophical theories are never refuted conclusively. (Or hardly ever, Gödel and Gettier may have done it.)" Edmund Gettier's (1963) landmark contribution to philosophy was responsible for setting the agenda for much of what we now know as contemporary epistemology-e.g., the existing debate over necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, epistemic internalism and externalism, relevant alternatives, epistemic luck, and much else besides. In recent years, however, experimental philosophers have begun raising questions about how widely shared the 'Gettier intuition'-viz., the intuition that
Really Knows
Only Believes Westerners 26% 74% East Asians 53% 47% South Asians 61% 39% When epistemic intuitions diverge about concrete cases where it had been previously assumed there would be nearly universal agreement, a challenge is posed to the evidential and argumentative force of those cases. Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) suggest that "a sizeable group of epistemological projects-a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition-would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true." One such hypothesis is that epistemic intuitions vary from culture to culture.
Of course, not everyone has been convinced by these recent results. Some point to the fact that Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) Ash has a friend, Brock, who has owned a Torchic for many years. Ash therefore thinks that Brock owns a fire type Pokémon. He is not aware, however, that his Torchic has recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Brock has replaced it with a Ponyta, which is a different kind of fire type Pokémon. Does Ash really know that Brock owns a fire type Pokémon, or does he only believe it?
Most readers unfamiliar with the world of Pokémon who read this example for the first time probably do not find the answer to Alex's question to be intuitively obvious. Most importantly, it should be clear that crosscultural differences in the familiarity participants have with concepts such as 'American car' or 'fire type Pokémon' do not amount to interesting differences in epistemic intuitions.
Simon Cullen (2010) presented Western subjects with the Gettier case reprinted above but instructed them to choose between saying either that Bob knows that Jill drives an American car or that Bob does not know that Jill drives an American car. Cullen correctly notes that 'really knows' seems to express a distinct concept from 'knows' and is perhaps more akin to 'knows with certainty.' When Western participants were offered the dichotomous choice between 'knows' and 'does not know,' 42% chose 'knows'-significantly higher than the percentage of those who chose 'really knows' in the Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) study. Cullen's study shows that conclusions drawn about participants' concept of 'knowledge' should not be drawn from participant responses to questions about 'really knowing,' but it should be kept in mind that this does not undermine conclusions one might want to draw about participants' concept of 'really knowing.'
More recently, the world of experimental philosophy began to buzz with excitement when word spread that Christina Starmans and Ori Friedman (2009) had found a significant gender difference in responses given to the following two Gettier cases:
Sue is about to do the dishes. She removes her wedding ring and lays it on the counter, alongside a dirty fork. She notices she is out of dish soap, so she locks her apartment and goes to the store downstairs to buy some. Sue's neighbor Ernest is a bit crazy, and has been spying on Sue through a peephole. While Sue is gone, he picks the lock to her apartment, and takes her wedding ring, replacing it with a cheap plastic ring from a gumball machine. He locks her apartment door, and returns home. Sue has only been gone for 5 minutes, and is now on her way back.
Peter is in his locked apartment, and is reading. He decides to have a shower. He puts his book down on the coffee table. Then he takes off his watch, and also puts it on the coffee Knobe's (2003a Knobe's ( , 2003b Knobe's ( , 2004 groundbreaking work on the Moreover, Nagel, San Juan, and Mar (forthcoming) recently undertook an investigation of Gettier case intuitions and found no gender-based differences.
'Knobe effect, ' Beebe and Buckwalter (2010) and Beebe and Jensen (2012) have found that participants are more likely to think an agent knows a given side-effect will result from their primary action when that side-effect is bad than when it is good-even when the evidence available to the agent in the bad condition is seemingly identical to the evidence available in the good condition. In other words, the goodness or badness of an action or the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the agent performing the action appears able to influence epistemic assessments of the agent's beliefs, even when traditional epistemic factors are held constant. In light of these results, it seems reasonable to expect that Gettier case intuitions can be made to vary by manipulating features of the actions that protagonists are performing in Gettier-style scenarios.
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We also predict that participants will be more likely to attribute knowledge in basic Gettier scenarios than they will be to deny or remain neutral about whether knowledge is present.
This prediction is based upon classroom experiences in which students in epistemology courses do not seem to display the Gettier intuition as readily as the overwhelming consensus among epistemologists regarding Gettier cases might lead some philosophers to expect.
In particular, we predict that participants will be more likely to attribute knowledge that an outcome will occur when that outcome is bad or if the agent is blameworthy, even if the agent's belief about that outcome is 'Gettierized.' How large an effect can be generated by such action manipulations remains to be seen.
In Sections 2 and 3 we report the results of two experiments that test the foregoing 
Experiment 1
The first case we developed was based upon Knobe's (2003a, p. 191) to rise/fall. In the coming months, local water quality rose/fell significantly.
As before, the first member of each italicized word or phrase pair represents the wording of the first condition, while the second member of each pair represents the wording of the second. As in any good Gettier case, the CEO's belief is both justified-he was given seemingly reliable testimony by the vice-president-and true-the water quality levels did in fact change. However, the change was due to an unforeseen factor. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following claim: "The CEO knew that local water quality levels were going to rise/fall." Answers were reported on a seven-point Likert scale, with '1' marked 'Strongly Disagree,' '4' marked 'Neutral' and '7' 'Strongly Agree.'
Following Knobe (2004) and Beebe and Jensen (2012) , a second Knobe effect case that concerned aesthetic (rather than moral) benefits or harms was turned into the following Gettier case pair:
MOVIES: The Vice-President of a movie studio was talking with the CEO. The VicePresident said: "We are thinking of implementing a new policy. If we implement the policy, it will increase profits for our corporation, and/but it will also make our movies better/worse from an artistic standpoint." The CEO said: "Look, I don't care one bit about making our movies better/worse from an artistic standpoint. All I care about is making as much profit as I can. Let's implement the new policy." They began implementing the new policy, but the Vice-President's prediction about the policy making their movies better/worse turned out to be incorrect. However, shortly after the new policy was implemented, another executive at the studio fired all of the movie studio's inexperienced screenplay writers and replaced them with award-winning writers/best screenplay writers and replaced them with inexperienced ones. The CEO was unaware of this executive's actions. He formed the belief that the artistic quality of his studio's movies would improve/go down soon. In the coming months, the quality of their movies improved/dropped significantly.
Again, the CEO's belief is both justified and true, but elements of luck prevent the justification and truth of his belief from being related in the expected fashion. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with statement "The CEO knew that the artistic quality of their movies was going to improve/drop," and their answers were recorded on the same kind of seven-point scale described above.
Following Knobe and Mendlow (2004) and Beebe and Jensen (2012) , a nonmoral Knobe effect case drawn from the business world was Gettierized in the following way:
SALES: Susan is the president of a major computer corporation. One day, her assistant came to her and said, "We are thinking of implementing a new corporate restructuring plan. It will simplify our corporate structure, and/but it will also increase/decrease sales Participants were asked whether they agreed that Susan knew that sales in New Jersey in the next quarter were going to increase or decrease. Finally, borrowing from Knobe (2007) and Beebe and Jensen (2012) , the following pair of Gettierized Knobe effect cases was constructed as well:
NAZI: In Nazi Germany, there was a law called the "racial identification law." The purpose of the law was to help identify people of certain races so that they could be rounded up and sent to concentration camps. Shortly after this law was passed, the CEO of a small corporation decided to make certain organizational changes. The vice-president of the corporation said: "By making those changes, you'll definitely be increasing our profits. But you'll also be fulfilling/violating the requirements of the racial identification law." The CEO said: "I don't care one bit about that. All I care about is making as much profit as I can. Let's make those organizational changes!" As soon as the CEO gave this order, the corporation began making the organizational changes. The vice-president's prediction about fulfilling/violating the requirements of the racial identification law turned out to be incorrect. However, shortly after the organizational changes were made, the requirements of the racial identification law were changed, so that the corporation's organizational changes now fulfilled/violated those requirements. The CEO was unaware of the recent changes in the law. He formed the belief that his corporation's organizational changes would fulfill/violate the law. The changes did in fact fulfill/violate the law.
Participants were asked whether they agreed that the CEO knew that the organizational changes would fulfill or violate the requirements of the law.
In a between subjects design 376 undergraduate college students (mean age = 21, 52%
female, 64% Anglo-American) from a large, public university in the northeastern United States were each given one of the cases from the four vignette pairs above. Mean participant responses are represented in Figure 1 , with other supporting details in Table 2 . There are two reasons the 'rise,' 'improve,' 'increase' and 'fulfill' conditions of the four vignette pairs are all labeled in Figure 1 as varieties of 'fulfill' conditions and each of the contrasting conditions are labeled 'violate' conditions. The first is simply for ease of reference. The second is that each of the actions in the 'fulfill' conditions fulfills some salient norm, while the actions in the 'violate'
conditions violate salient norms. Although we believe that the contrast between fulfilling and violating a norm is likely to figure in the ultimate explanation of why participants responded as they did
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, we do not wish to claim at this point that it is the primary explanatory factor. Table 2 . Means, medians, modes, and standard errors for participant responses to each of the four pairs of cases used in Experiment 1.
The first thing to note about the mean responses in Figure 1 and Table 2 is that the first seven out of eight of them lie within .66 of the neutral midpoint of '4,' even though each vignette represents a Gettier case. In the 'fulfill' conditions of WATER, MOVIES and NAZI, the most common participant response was '4.' Participants in these conditions chose either to remain neutral (by selecting '4') or to attribute knowledge (by selecting '5,' '6' or '7') 51%, 59%, and 50% of the time. Even in the increase condition of SALES, where '1' and '2' were the most common answers, 46% of participants selected '4,' '5,' '6' or '7.' In other words, in the absence of any 'Knobe effect factor' that might drive up knowledge attributions, participants were not significantly more inclined to deny knowledge than they were to fail to deny it. Some scholars (e.g., Nadelhoffer
2004; Alicke 2008) have argued that participants' comparatively stronger inclinations to attribute certain folk psychological states in Knobe effect cases can be explained to a large extent by (often affect-driven) cognitive processes that are responsible for blame attribution having a distorting effect upon the processes responsible for other mental state attributions. These kinds of considerations, however, cannot be marshaled to explain why participants were as willing to attribute knowledge in the 'fulfill' conditions of Experiment 1 as they were, since the actions performed in these cases are not in general blameworthy. 
Experiment 2
In a further investigation of participants' intuitions about cases that combine elements from both the Gettier case and the Knobe effect literatures, we took several well-known Gettier cases and 'Knobified' them. In other words, we took protagonists from familiar Gettier cases and in some conditions had those protagonists engage in acts of moral turpitude. For each Gettier case and Knobified Gettier case pair, we also constructed an unGettiered counterpart-i.e., a case that lacks the kind of epistemic luck characteristic of Gettier cases-in order to have a control to which to compare the other two cases. Our prediction was that participants would be more likely to attribute knowledge in each of the Knobified Gettier cases than in either the original Gettier cases or the unGettiered controls. As we will see below, our predictions were half right and half wrong.
The first case we chose was the following one from Bryan Skyrms (1967) , which in contrast to each of Gettier's original cases does not have the protagonist drawing any sort of inference to the Gettierized belief in question:
MATCH1: A pyromaniac has just purchased a box of Sure-Fire Matches. He has done so many times before and has noted that they have always lit when struck unless they were wet. Furthermore, he knows that oxygen must be present for things to burn and that the observed regularity between matches' being struck and their lighting is not a mere coincidence. After perceiving that the matches are dry and that there is plenty of oxygen present, he proceeds to strike one of the matches, confident that it will light. It does.
Unbeknownst to the pyromaniac, however, the match happens to contain impurities that prevent it from lighting simply by being struck. What ignited the match was an extremely rare burst of cosmic radiation that happened to arrive at just the right place at the very moment the match was being struck.
Participants were then asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following claim: "The pyromaniac knew that the match would light." Participants were then asked to select 'Strongly Disagree,' 'Disagree,' 'Neutral,' 'Agree,' or 'Strongly Agree' as their answer. A different answer format was used in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 because participants in Experiment 2 completed an online questionnaire rather than a pencil and paper one and having five rather than seven answer choices seemed better suited to the online platform that was used.
The following case was constructed in which many of the essential features of MATCH1
were preserved but where significant harm resulted from the match being lit:
MATCH2: A deeply disturbed criminal has just purchased a box of Sure-Fire Matches.
He wants to burn down a local orphanage in the middle of the night, killing all of the children inside. He has purchased Sure-Fire Matches many times before and has noted that they have always lit when struck unless they were wet. Furthermore, he knows that oxygen must be present for things to burn and that the observed regularity between matches' being struck and their lighting is not a mere coincidence. During the middle of the night the criminal sneaks over to the orphanage and pours a large amount of highly flammable liquid all around the outside of the building. After perceiving that the matches are dry and that there is plenty of oxygen present, he proceeds to strike one of the matches, confident that it will light. It does. Unbeknownst to the criminal, however, the match happens to contain impurities that prevent it from lighting simply by being struck.
What ignited the match was an extremely rare burst of cosmic radiation that happened to arrive at just the right place at the very moment the match was being struck.
Participants were then asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that the criminal knew that the match would light. Answer choices were the same as in MATCH1.
The following unGettiered case was also constructed, in which the elements of epistemic luck found in MATCH1 were omitted:
MATCH3: A pyromaniac has just purchased a box of Trusty Matches. He has done so many times before and has noted that they have always lit when struck unless they were wet. Furthermore, he knows that oxygen must be present for things to burn and that the observed regularity between matches' being struck and their lighting is not a mere coincidence. After perceiving that the matches are dry and that there is plenty of oxygen present, he proceeds to strike one of the matches, confident that it will light. It does.
Participants were asked to judge the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following claim: "The pyromaniac knew that the match would light." female, 73% Anglo-American) from a large, public university in the northeastern United States received one of the three match vignettes described above. The mean response for each vignette is represented in Figure 2 . In each of the figures in this section, 'Strongly Disagree' is represented on the y axis as '1,' 'Disagree' as '2,' 'Neutral' as '3,' 'Agree' as '4,' and 'Strongly Agree' as '5.' As predicted, attributions of knowledge were highest in the significant harm version of MATCH. However, while the difference between the mean responses in MATCH2
and MATCH1 was statistically significant, the difference between the means in MATCH2 and MATCH3 was not. 11 Unsurprisingly, the difference between the average response in the Gettiered and unGettiered conditions (i.e., MATCH1 and MATCH3) was statistically significant as well. Strikingly, however, the most common response in each condition of the three conditions was 'Agree.' Moreover, 53% of participants in MATCH1 chose either 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree,' while 77% in MATCH2 and 78% in MATCH3 did so as well. Importantly, the mean response in MATCH2-a Gettier case-was significantly above the midpoint with a large effect size. 12 The mean response in MATCH1 did not differ significantly from the midpoint, but this is itself a noteworthy result, since MATCH1 is Skyrms' original Gettier case.
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A second set of Knobified Gettier cases was constructed around the following widely discussed case due to Gilbert Harman (1973, p. Philosophers who draw a distinction between Gettier cases and barn-façade cases would likely count MAIL1-and, as we will see below, POLITICIAN1-as instances of the latter rather than the former. However, since MAIL1 involves the kind of double epistemic luck that for present purposes we are taking to characterize Gettier cases, we will treat it as one. Participants were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that Gilbert knows that Donald is in Italy and were again given the answer choices of 'Strongly Disagree, 'Disagree,' 'Neutral,' 'Agree,' and 'Strongly Agree.'
In Experiment 1, building upon the work of Beebe and Buckwalter (2010) and Beebe and Jensen (2012), we found that wrongdoers were more likely to be viewed as knowers than their good or neutral counterparts. Although some experimental philosophers (e.g., Schaffer and
Knobe 2012) have suggested that simply having wrongdoing in a vignette might make participants more likely to attribute knowledge to characters in the story who were simply innocent or neutral bystanders, we hypothesized that it would not have this kind of effect. In order to investigate the issue, we transformed Donald-the seemingly innocent trickster of and then we asked participants whether Gilbert-the innocent bystander-had knowledge. A third set of Knobified Gettier cases also drew inspiration from the influential work of Harman (1973, pp. 143-144) , the first member of which was the following: POLITICIAN1: A political leader is assassinated. His associates, fearing a coup, decide to pretend that the bullet hit someone else. On nationwide television they announce that an assassination attempt has failed to kill the leader but has killed a secret service agent by mistake. However, before the announcement is made, an enterprising reporter on the scene faxes the real story to her news agency so that the story can be included in the day's final edition of the paper. Jill buys a copy of that paper and reads the story of the assassination that was dictated by the reporter who witnessed the event. Unlike most everyone else, Jill has not heard about the false television report. ** * ** ** Participants were asked "Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following claim: 'Jill knows that the political leader has been assassinated.'" Answer choices again ranged from 'Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree.' Although elements of wrongdoing were already present in POLITICIAN1-an assassination, a coup, a cover up-the putative knower was not herself a wrongdoer. She was merely a neutral observer. In the following variation on Harman's original case, the putative knower becomes the central doer of wrong: POLITICIAN2: Ivan plans to assassinate a recently elected politician. Because the politician's bodyguards and associates fear for his life, they decide to pretend that the politician is away from the capital city until they can formulate a better plan for his protection. On nationwide television they announce that the politician is taking a twoweek journey to another country. However, before the announcement is made, a reporter closely following the politician faxes a story containing correct information about the politician's whereabouts to her news agency, and the story is included in the day's final edition of the paper. Ivan buys a copy of that paper and reads the correct information about the politician's location. Unlike most everyone else, Ivan has not heard about the false television report. Ivan then travels to the location specified in the newspaper and assassinates the politician and his bodyguards.
Participants were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that Ivan knew where the politician could be found. 17 17 KM has raised the following concern about the wording of POLITICIAN2. The vignette does not make it as clear as it should that in thinking about whether Ivan knew where the politician could be found participants were supposed to be thinking of whether Ivan had knowledge after reading the newspaper but before seeing and assassinating the politician. While we agree that the vignette does not foreclose this possibility as much as it could have, we believe the most charitable way for participants to interpret the vignette is in accord with its intended meaning.
The following, unGettiered version of the original was also constructed for the sake of comparison: POLITICIAN3: A political leader is assassinated. A reporter on the scene sends news of the assassination to her news agency so that the story can be included in the day's final edition of the paper. Jill buys a copy of that paper and reads the story of the assassination that was dictated by the reporter who witnessed the event.
Participants were asked they agreed that Jill knows that the political leader has been assassinated.
In a between subjects design 189 undergraduate college students (mean age = 31, 53% female, 79% Anglo-American) from a large, public university in the northeastern United States were given one of the POLITICIAN cases above. Their mean responses are represented in Figure   4 . As expected, participants given the significant harm version (i.e., POLITICIAN2) were more likely to attribute knowledge to the central protagonist than in Harman's original POLITICIAN case. These results provide further confirmation for the hypothesis that participants are not equally likely to attribute knowledge to observers of wrongdoing as they are to attribute knowledge to doers of wrong. Participants were not, however, more likely to attribute knowledge in POLITICIAN2 than in POLITICIAN3, despite the fact that 83% of participants in the former condition agreed or strongly agreed that Ivan knows that the political leader has been assassinated, while only 65% in the latter gave a similar verdict about Jill.
18 Importantly, the mean responses in all three conditions of the POLITICIAN vignette set were significantly above the neutral midpoint, with medium to extremely large effect sizes. CLOCK1: Mary works as a clerk in an office. She is clear-headed and has excellent eyesight. Mary knows that she set the clock above her desk accurately and that it has been completely reliable for many years. At 3:00pm Mary looks up at the clock and sees that it reads "3:00pm," and indeed, it is 3:00pm. However, unknown to Mary, the clock stopped working exactly 24 hours ago.
Participants were asked whether Mary knows that the time is 3:00pm. The following significant harm version was constructed by modifying CLOCK1:
CLOCK2: John is a terrorist. He plans to detonate a bomb in a crowded city shopping mall at a time when a local politician will be arriving to give a press conference there.
John is clear-headed and has excellent eye-sight. He knows that he set the time of his ** ** ** ** ** wristwatch accurately and that it has been completely reliable for many years. At 3:00pm
John looks at his watch and sees that it reads "3:00pm," and indeed, it is 3:00pm.
However, unbeknownst to John, his watch stopped working exactly 24 hours ago. John detonates the bomb, killing the politician and dozens of bystanders.
Finally, an unGettiered version of CLOCK1 was constructed for the sake of comparison:
CLOCK3: Wendy works as a clerk in an office. She is clear-headed and has excellent eye-sight. Wendy knows that she set the clock above her desk accurately and that it has been completely reliable for many years. At 3:00pm Wendy looks up at the clock and sees that it reads "3:00pm," and indeed, it is 3:00pm.
In a between subjects design 175 undergraduate college students (mean age = 26, 53% female, 85% Anglo-American) from a large, public university in the northeastern United States were given one of the CLOCK cases above. Mean responses are represented in Figure 5 . The mean response in CLOCK2 fell in between the means for CLOCK1 and CLOCK3, and the difference between the CLOCK2 mean and the means in the other two conditions failed to be statistically significant. 20 However, the difference between the CLOCK1 and CLOCK3 means was statistically significant. Only the mean for CLOCK3 was significantly above the midpoint. Collapsing participant responses across all four sets of cases used in Experiment 2 yields the comparison represented in Figure 6 . Participants were on the whole more likely to attribute knowledge in every case than they were to deny knowledge to the central protagonists. All of the collapsed means fell significantly above the midpoint and differed significantly from one another at the .01 level. 23 The 'Knobifying' effect was also significant, although not quite as large as we had originally predicted. In none of the four sets of cases used in Experiment 2 was there a main effect for gender or an interaction effect between gender and any of the separate conditions. 24 22 Using a forced-choice format, Nagel (forthcoming b) reports that 44% of participants she presented with a stopped clock Gettier case ascribed knowledge to the protagonist of the story. 
Conclusion
Too many experimental philosophers make the mistake of assuming that psychological theses about how ordinary participants will respond to experimental materials follow quite directly and unproblematically from philosophical theses about the nature of knowledge or about the correct way to view those materials. Philosophers who believe that the correct judgment to make about a particular thought experiment is that the protagonist fails to have knowledge might think that most ordinary people will agree with this verdict. But such a belief is not required by the mere fact that these philosophers believe this is the correct way to view the thought experiment. They Nonetheless, while we do not want to oversimplify the relationship between philosophical theses and psychological predictions, we do believe that running throughout the Gettier literature has been a fairly strong (if unspoken) consensus about how ordinary subjects would in fact respond to those cases. According to this consensus, in the absence of formal training in philosophy, the apprehension of abstract principles about the nature of knowledge, or even much intellectual acumen, most of the folk should judge that protagonists in Gettier cases fail to have knowledge. We take this psychological thesis to be challenged by our results.
The two most pressing explanatory questions raised by our results concern the reasons why participants attributed knowledge as often or as strongly as they did in Gettier cases and why they were more inclined to attribute knowledge in 'Knobified' cases than in their 'unKnobified' counterparts. Starmans and Friedman (2012) recently found that participants were more willing to say that protagonists in several Gettier cases 'really know' certain facts than they were to say the protagonists 'only believe' or 'only think' the facts are true. According to Starmans and Friedman (2012, p. 279) , their findings suggest that "people's folk conception of knowledge fits, at least roughly, with the classical philosophical view of knowledge as justified true belief, and conflicts with the current philosophical conception in which Gettiered individuals are viewed as not possessing knowledge." While we find this suggestion to represent an intriguing possibility, we think it is a bit premature, since participants in other studies have shown a reluctance to attribute knowledge in Gettier cases. Nagel (forthcoming a) suggests that low levels of participant motivation might be an important factor in keeping some participants from denying knowledge in Gettier cases:
Participants who are not interested in a particular story may be more inclined to respond to it randomly. Philosophers and others may have the same basic intuitive capacity to register the presence or absence of knowledge, but philosophers may be more motivated to read epistemic vignettes with an eye to exercising this capacity.
Responding randomly to research materials pushes the distribution of answers toward the midpoint and away from either extreme. The traditionally correct response to Gettier cases, of course, lies at one extreme. One important factor that gives philosophers an increased level of motivation when reading such stories is their appreciation of the broader dialectical context in which the thought experiment is offered as an intuitive test of an epistemological theory.
Relatedly, throughout the data obtained by experimental epistemologists participants appears to display a general bias in favor of agreement, as opposed to disagreement. Since most experimental materials ask participants whether protagonists know but rarely ask if protagonists fail to know, the data that has been obtained so far may not fully reflect participants' true epistemic intuitions, if those intuitions are filtered through a general tendency to be agreeable or accommodating.
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Regarding the question of why participants in our studies were more inclined to attribute knowledge in 'Knobified' cases than in their 'unKnobified' counterparts, Alfano, Beebe, and Robinson (2012) hypothesize that having practical reasons for paying attention to certain possibilities (a) makes rational agents more likely to form beliefs (and more likely to form stronger beliefs) about those possibilities than about possibilities they have less practical reason to consider and (b) makes rational observers more likely to attribute beliefs (and greater degrees of belief) about those possibilities to agents. Although knowledge is not equivalent to firmly held belief, Alfano, Beebe, and Robinson hypothesize that an increased willingness to attribute belief or stronger degrees of belief often leads ordinary participants to be more likely to attribute knowledge as well. Describing the thought process of the protagonist in Knobe's original environment case, Alfano, Beebe, and Robinson (2012, p. 269) write:
For this reason, we have not placed as much emphasis on the fact that participants were found to attribute knowledge in Gettier cases as we have on the fact that participants were more inclined to attribute knowledge in Gettier cases when wrongdoing was involved.
The chairman in the HELP condition, for example, does not need to say to himself, "Wait! I need to stop and think carefully about whether helping the environment is 25 Thanks to KM for getting us to see the relevance of this issue.
something that I should be doing." In the HARM condition, however, an inner monologue like this might well be appropriate. The same seems to hold for the CEO who is considering violating or fulfilling a racial identification law in Nazi Germany and indeed for any of the other protagonists in the Knobe effect literature.
Because of the potential costs involved, the chairman who harms the environment, the movie studio executive who decreases the quality of his movies, and the CEO who violates a Nazi law all need to consider with some degree of care whether they are embarking upon the right course of action, whereas their counterparts do not seem to have a similar need (or at least do not have as significant a need to do so). Alfano, Beebe, and Robinson suggest that the need to engage in careful reflection leads participants to think that protagonists in harmful or blameworthy conditions are more likely to have knowledge about the outcomes of their actions than protagonists in good or neutral conditions. They also suggest that the stronger tendency to attribute belief in harm cases than in help cases may lead participants to be more likely to attribute intentionality in the former kind of case.
The central virtue of Alfano, Beebe, and Robinson's account is that it provides an elegant explanation of the original Knobe effect, the epistemic side-effect effect, the Knobe effect for belief ascriptions (Beebe forthcoming) , and the data reported above. However, the fact remains that something like the Knobe effect has been found across a dizzying variety of domains and that (despite the confident proclamations of some) the experimental philosophy community has no very clear idea about whether or how all of these cases might be explained by a single, overarching theory. For this reason, while we think the suggestion of Alfano, Beebe, and Robinson holds some promise, we do not think it would be wise at this stage of the empirical investigation of these folk psychological notions to invest in it a markedly high degree of confidence.
Another issue that should be examined in further detail is whether more reflective participants or those who have been primed to engage in deeper levels of reflection will be as likely as our participants to attribute knowledge in Gettier and Knobe effect cases. Using Shane Frederick's (2005) cognitive reflection test-a measure of reflectiveness that is strongly correlated with general intelligence-N. Ángel Pinillos et al. (2011) found that greater reflectiveness was correlated with a decreased asymmetry in attributions of intentionality in the help and harm versions of Knobe's original ENVIRONMENT case. In other words, there was less of a Knobe effect among the more reflective. It would be interesting to see the extent to which greater reflectiveness is associated with decreased asymmetry in knowledge attributions across a variety of Knobe effect cases and what effect greater reflectiveness might have on participants' willingness to attribute knowledge in Gettier cases.
In conclusion, despite the fact that it seems too early to know how to explain the full range of Knobe effects, our results demonstrate some further respects in which folk epistemic assessments can be influenced by what appear to be epistemically irrelevant factors. If
Gettierizing factors are capable of robbing a subject of knowledge, it seems they should do so regardless of whether that subject is performing positive or negative actions. The fact that folk epistemic assessments are affected by such factors seems to provide an additional reason why untutored epistemic intuitions might be a poor foundation upon which to base a philosophical account of the true nature of knowledge.
